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CaseNo.20070485-CA 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANIEL LEE KEENER, 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iii) (West 2004), and child endangerment, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)(e) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the officer applying for the search warrant intentionally or recklessly mislead 
the magistrate in the warrant affidavit, materially affecting the probable cause finding? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress is a 
mixed question of law and fact The court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially 
for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 
2004 UT 95,111, 103 P.3d 699. The court's underlying factual findings, including an 
officer's credibility, are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11,100 
R3d 1222. 
2. If a warrant affidavit includes an intentional or reckless misrepresen-tation, does 
the Utah Constitution's exclusionary rule require suppression, even if the misrepresentation 
is not material to the probable cause determination? 
Standard of Review. The interpretation of the Utah Constitution is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, f 19,44 P3d 756. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const amend. TV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Const Art I, Sec 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following the execution of a search warrant for Defendant's home, the State charged 
Defendant with one count of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree 
felony; three counts of child endangennent, all third degree felonies; and one count of 
possessing drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-3; 41-46. Defendant moved to 
suppress the evidence seized from his home, arguing that the warrant affidavit was 
inadequate under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. R. 60-88,121-30. After holding an evidentiary hearing, 
the court denied the motion. R. 108-09,131-66,167-71,221. Defendant filed a petition for 
permission to appeal the suppression order, but the same was denied. R. 177,187. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute and child endangennent, both third degree felonies, and the remaining 
charges were dismissed. R. 190-203. In so pleading, Defendant reserved the right to appeal 
the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress. R. 195-97. The trial court sentenced 
Defendant to consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years on each count, suspended 
imposition of the sentence, and placed Defendant on supervised probation for 36 months. R. 
210-12. Defendant timely appealed. R. 213-14. 
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SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On December 9, 2005, Detective Doug Teerlink of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department prepared a probable cause affidavit in support of a warrant to search Defendant's 
residence, located at 849 North Sir Phillip Drive ('Teerlink affidavit"). R. 78-81. That same 
day, Detective Michael Hardin prepared a probable cause affidavit in support of a warrant to 
search the home of Defendant's father, Daniel Vern Keener (DVK), located at 1381 South 
Emery Street ("Hardin affidavit"). R. 82-86. Both affidavits largely relied on information 
obtained from Gary Lambson. SeeR. 78-86. The two detectives presented the affidavits to 
the same magistrate at the same time. R. 221: 26. After reviewing them, the magistrate 
issued search warrants for both residences. R. 221: 22,26. 
Teerlink Affidavit 
The Teerlink affidavit represented that a "concerned citizen named Gary Lambson5' 
was "questioned" by police after he attempted to sell a stolen ring to Mike's Custom Jewelry 
and Repair ("Mike's Jewelry"). R. 79-80. As represented in the affidavit, Lambson told 
police that: 
1. On 6 December 2005, he met Defendant's father "for the purpose of buying 
jewelry," and the two traveled to Defendant's residence on Sir Phillip Drive, R. 79; 
2. Once inside the residence, Defendant's father "retrieved a bag of jewelry" 
containing "rings, necklaces, watches and bracelets," R. 79; 
3. Lambson purchased one of the rings in the bag from Defendant's father for $50, 
R. 79; 
4. Defendant's father "put some of the jewelry in his pocket," but "left most of [it] 
in the bag at the residence," R. 79; and 
4 
5. Two days later, on 8 December 2005, Lambson took the ring he purchased from 
Defendant's father to Mike's Jewelry to sell it, R. 79. 
In addition to the information provided by Lambson, the Teerlink affidavit stated that 
6. When Lambson tried to sell the ring, the store clerk at Mike's Jewelry recognized 
the ring as a "custom made ring" that had been stolen from another employee's car in 
Salt Lake City, along with other jewelry, about a month earlier on November 5,2005, R. 
79-80; 
7. Police responded to Mike's Jewelry and questioned Lambson, R. 80; and 
8. When Detective Teerlink showed Lambson a list of jewelry stolen from the 
employee's vehicle, Lambson identified a yellow and white gold diamond ring and a blue 
turquoise stretch bracelet as items he saw in the bag of jewelry at Defendant's residence, 
R.80. 
In addition to the circumstances related to Lambson's purchase of the ring, the 
affidavit revealed that Lambson told Detective Teerlink that Defendant was also selling 
marijuana from his residence. R. 79. Lambson said that while he was at Defendant's home 
to purchase the ring, he saw "two large bags of marijuana and a triple beam scale" on a table 
in a back room. R. 79. He stated that one of the bags contained "chronic" marijuana (high 
quality) and the other lower grade marijuana. R. 79. 
Detective Teerlink stated in the affidavit that he "considers the information received 
from the concerned citizen [Lambson] to be accurate and reliable because:" 
1. Lambson provided Detective Teerlink "with his name, date of birth and criminal 
history," R. 80; 
2. Detective Teerlink "informed Mr. Lambson that "if he gave [the detective] any 
false information he would be charged with interfering with an investigation," R. 80; 
3. A criminal history check revealed that Defendant "has been arrested for numerous 
thefts including an Aggravated Burglary on 02/26/2000, numerous drug charges (the 
most recent on 05/12/05) and Strong Arm Robbery on 10/05/91," R. 80; and 
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4. A criminal history check revealed that Defendant's father "has been arrested 
numerous times for Possession of a Controlled Substance," the most recent of which was 
on 5/5/2002, and once for "Carrying a Loaded Fire Arm in a Vehicle on 6/30/1989, R. 
80. 
Hardin Affidavit 
The Hardin affidavit for Defendant's father's residence also recounted Lambson's 
purchase and attempt to sell the stolen ring, adding that Defendant's father returned to his 
home on Emery Street after Lambson's purchase of the ring and that an Anne Klein wrist 
watch was among the items of jewelry Defendant's father placed in his pocket after the 
transaction. R. 83. Like the Teerlink affidavit, the Hardin affidavit summarized the criminal 
histories of both Defendant and his father. R. 84. The Hardin affidavit also added 
information, not included in the Teerlink affidavit, indicating that Lambson "was detained by 
Murray Police, concerning a stolen ring," when he was interviewed by Detective Hardin. R. 
83. 
Franks Evidentiary Hearing Testimony 
After obtaining the warrants, the detectives searched the residences of Defendant and 
his father. R. 221: 24. Lambson was detained at the police station during the execution of 
the warrants, where he remained until after the search warrants had been executed and 
Defendant and his father had been detained. R. 221: 24,26. 
The only promise Detective Teerlink made to Lambson during his interview with him 
was that "if [Lambson] lied ... in any way about the investigation, ... [Teerlink] would 
charge him for false information and interfering in an investigation." R. 221: 23, 28-29. 
Detective Teerlink made no promise that Lambson would not be charged with a crime if he 
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provided information to the police. R. 221: 23. No decision had been made when the 
warrants were obtained as to whether charges would be filed against Lambson. R. 221:23-
24. It was not until police were executing the warrants that Detective Teerlink suggested to 
Detective Hardin that Lambson not be charged. R. 221: 24. 
When Detective Teerlink was questioned about his description of Lambson as a 
"concerned citizen," he testified that he was simply attempting to place Lambson in a 
category that "seemed to fit him." R. 221: 30. He explained that he did not identify 
Lambson as a confidential informant because Lambson had not participated in controlled 
drug buys for the police and had not been promised anything in return for the information he 
provided. R. 221: 25, 30. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly found that the affidavit supporting the search warrant for 
Defendant's home was not intentionally or recklessly misleading. Although the affidavit 
characterized the informant as a concerned citizen, it was not misleading, because it fully 
explained that the informant provided the information only upon being questioned by police 
after he was caught trying to sell a stolen ring. The affidavit was also submitted 
simultaneously with an affidavit supporting a warrant to search Defendant's father's home, 
which disclosed that the informant was detained by police. Under these circumstances, the 
trial court properly looked to both affidavits in concluding that the affidavit was not 
misleading and that the officer did not otherwise intentionally or recklessly mislead the 
magistrate. 
7 
Even when viewed in isolation, the affidavit was not misleading. The magistrate was 
advised of the circumstances that led to the questioning of the informant, enabling her to 
make an independent probable cause determination. The informant's detention status would 
not have detracted from the probable cause showing. Indeed, disclosure of the detention 
status could have only increased the informant's reliability because he could be held 
accountable for his representations. Finally, the affidavit disclosed that the informant had a 
criminal history. Including the details of that history would not diminish further the 
informant's credibility. Thus, even if the affidavit were modified as Defendant suggests, it 
would still establish probable cause. The informant provided a detailed, first-hand account 
of his purchase of the stolen ring, he provided the information under circumstances in which 
he could be held accountable for his allegations, and he provided information against his 
penal interest Moreover, Defendant's criminal history further supported the informant's 
allegations. 
Defendant claims that even if the alleged misrepresentations were immaterial to the 
probable cause determination, the evidence should be suppressed under the Utah 
Constitution. This Court need not and should not address this claim, because the trial court 
properly found that the affidavit was not misleading. In any event, exclusion is not 
appropriate because Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution does not extend greater 
protection than the Fourth Amendment under these circumstances. Moreover, extension of 
the exclusionary rule to cases involving immaterial misrepresentations is not warranted, as it 
is inconsistent with the intent of the framers and is contrary to sound public policy. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized 
under the search warrant for his home on Sir Phillip Drive. He contends that in the affidavit 
of probable cause, Detective Teerlink intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, 
mischaracterized the informant, Gary Lambson, as a "concerned citizen" and improperly 
omitted Lambson's detention status and criminal history. Aplt. Brf. at 13-20. Defendant 
argues that the mischaracterization of the informant and the omissions were material to the 
magistrate's probable cause determination, requiring suppression of the evidence. Aplt. Brf. 
at 20-39. He also argues that even if the "concerned citizen" label and the omissions were 
not material to the probable cause determination, the evidence should nevertheless be 
suppressed under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Aplt. Brf. at 39-47. 
Defendant's arguments lack merit 
I. 
THE WARRANT WAS SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE, EVEN 
IF THE OFFICER MISLABELED THE INFORMANT AS A 
"CONCERNED CITIZEN" AND IMPROPERLY OMITTED HIS 
DETENTION STATUS AND CRIMINAL RECORD 
'The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection... is the Warrant Clause, requiring 
that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and disinterested 
magistrate before embarking upon a search." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,164 (1978). 
To obtain a warrant, an officer must submit an affidavit that "set[s] forth particular facts and 
circumstances underlying the existence of probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to 
make an independent evaluation of the matter." Id. at 165. In reviewing the affidavit, the 
9 
magistrate makes a "'practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances, 
there is a fair probability that the contraband will be found in the place described/" State v. 
Saddler, 2004 UT 105,111, 104 P.3d 1265 (quoting State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 
(Utah 1987)). 
The ability of the magistrate to conduct an independent reviews is, of course, 
dependent on the good faith of the officer seeking the warrant. In other words, the value of 
the warrant protection can only be realized if the officer submitting the warrant affidavit 
makes a "truthful showing" of evidence supporting probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-
65 (quotation and citation omitted). "This does not mean 'truthful* in the sense that every 
fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded 
upon information received from informants, as well as upon information within the affiant's 
own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily." Id. at 165. Rather, truthful 
means that the information in the affidavit "is believed or appropriately accepted by the 
affiant as true." Id. The United States Supreme Court has held that the information 
contained in a warrant affidavit carries a "presumption of validity." Id. at 171. 
A. EVTOENC^OBTAINEDPURSUANTTOAWARRAOT 
THE AFFIANT DELIBERATELY OR RECKLESSLY MISREPRESENTED THE FACTS 
IN THE AFFIDAVIT AND THE MISREPRESENTATION WAS MATERIAL TO THE 
PROBABLE CAUSE FINDING. 
In Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court held that where a warrant affidavit 
includes "allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth," evidence 
obtained pursuant to the warrant should be suppressed if the allegedly false statements are 
material to the probable cause finding. Id. at 171-72. In State v. Nielsen, the Utah Supreme 
10 
Court held that "[b]y extension of reasoning, the same test applies when a misstatement 
occurs because information is omitted." State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188,191 (Utah 1986); 
accord United States v. McKissick, 204 R3d 1282,1297 (10th Cir. 2000). 
Under Franks and Nielsen, a challenge to a warrant based on an allegedly misleading 
affidavit ("Franks motion") involves a two-step process. First, the defendant must 
demonstrate that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing by (a) making a "substantial 
preliminary showing" that the affiant intentionally or recklessly misled the magistrate in the 
affidavit, and (b) demonstrating that the alleged misrepresentation was "necessary to the 
finding of probable cause." Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56,171. If the defendant makes that 
showing, he proceeds to step two—an evidentiary hearing. There, the defendant must prove, 
"by a preponderance of the evidence," that the affidavit was misleading, whether by 
inclusion or omission, and that the affiant deliberately or recklessly misled the magistrate. 
Id. at 156. If the defendant meets his evidentiary burden, "and... the affidavit's [modified] 
content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the 
fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face 
of the affidavit" Id. 
Under step one, the defendant must "point out specifically the portion of the warrant 
affidavit that is claimed to be false," or otherwise misleading, and affirmatively allege that 
the affiant misled the magistrate "deliberately] . . . or [with] reckless disregard for the 
truth." Id. at 171. The alleged misrepresentation may not be speculative or conclusory, but 
must be "accompanied by an offer of proof and supported by "[a]ffidavits or sworn or 
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otherwise reliable statements of witnesses..., or their absence satisfactorily explained." Id. 
In addition, the defendant must give "supporting reasons" for suppression, i.e., he must 
demonstrate that when the "alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side," id. at 171-
72, or "the omitted information is inserted," Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191, the modified affidavit 
is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72; Nielsen, 
727 P.2d at 191. Absent this additional showing, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. 
See United States v. Souffront, 338 F.3d 809, 822 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Martin, 
332 F.3d 827,834 (5th Cir. .2003); McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1297; United States v. Cross, 928 
F.2d 1030,1041 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36,47 (1st Cir. 
1990).1 
If the defendant satisfies the requirements of step one, he is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing under step two. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156,171-72. At that hearing, the defendant 
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged information was both 
false and intentionally or recklessly included. Id. at 171. In the case of an omission, the 
defendant must prove that the omission was both material to the probable cause finding and 
intentionally or recklessly omitted. Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. Establishing that a fact was 
false, or that a material fact was not included in the affidavit, necessarily requires the 
introduction of evidence beyond the four corners of the affidavit Similarly, to prove that the 
affiant deliberately or recklessly misled the magistrate, the defendant must offer either 
1
 This requirement promotes judicial economy by allowing an evidentiary hearing 
only if the defendant demonstrates that he or she is likely to prevail if the alleged 
misrepresentations prove true. 
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"direct evidence of the affiant's state of mind," or, more commonly, "inferential evidence 
that the affiant had obvious reasons for [ignoring or] omitting facts." Souffront, 338 F.3d at 
822 (quotation and citation omitted). 
B. AFTER PROCEEDING DIRECTLY TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING (STEP TWO), 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT DETECTIVE TEERLINK DID NOT 
INTENTIONALLY OR RECKLESSLY MISLEAD THE MAGISTRATE AND RULED 
THAT THE WARRANT WAS SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE. 
After receiving Defendant's Franks motion and the State's response, the trial court 
proceeded directly to step two—the evidentiary hearing—without determining whether 
Defendant had made a showing that he was entided to an evidentiary hearing, under step 
one. See R. 56-109, 221. Following the evidentiary hearing, the parties submitted 
supplemental memoranda, R. 110-66, and the trial court thereafter denied Defendant's 
motion, R. 167-71. 
In its memorandum decision, the trial court first found that Detective Teerlink did not 
mislead the magistrate, intentionally or otherwise. The court noted that "[h]ad Detective 
Teerlink's affidavit stood alone, his characterization of Lambson as a 'concerned citizen' 
would be troubling to the court." R. 169. The court observed, however, that the affidavit 
"did not stand alone; rather, it was submitted alongside Detective Hardin's affidavit, which 
pointed out that Lambson had been 'detained by Murray Police' regarding 'a stolen ring.'" 
R. 169. The court found that "[t]hat reference in Detective Hardin's affidavit, combined with 
Detective Teerlink's knowledge that [the magistrate] would be reviewing both his and 
Detective Hardin's affidavits together, dispelled any potential false impression." R. 169. 
The trial court also rejected any notion that Detective Teerlink attempted to mislead the 
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magistrate by characterizing Lambson as a concerned citizen. The court found that it was 
"as if [Detective Teerlink and Detective Hardin] defined 'concerned citizen' to mean Gary 
Lambson, a person of interest detained by the authorities." R. 169. 
The trial court then ruled that based on the two affidavits, the magistrate "'had a 
substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed and that evidence of illegal 
conduct would be found at the' Sir Phillip Drive location." R. 169. The court observed that 
the affidavit "contained a detailed account of a transaction at [Defendant's] residence 
involving the purchase of reportedly stolen merchandise" and "an account of the existence of 
marijuana that was specific as to quantity, type, and location." R. 169-70. The court 
concluded that "[t]his particularized information, combined with the fact that the detectives 
knew Lambson's identity and disclosed it, that Lambson obtained this information first-hand, 
and that he was willing to stand behind the information despite being threatened with 
prosecution if it turned out to be false[,] providefd] the requisite substantial basis." R. 170. 
C. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
MAGISTRATE WAS NOT MISLED ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF THE INFORMANT. 
Defendant contends that contrary to the trial court's findings, Detective Teerlink 
intentionally or recklessly misled the magistrate about the reliability of Gary Lambson by (1) 
characterizing Lambson as a "concerned citizen/' (2) failing to disclose that Lambson was 
being detained by police, and (3) failing to include the details of Lambson's criminal history. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's findings. 
'Tactual findings underlying a motion to suppress are evaluated for clear error." State 
v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,112,164 P.3d 397. Factual findings are clearly erroneous only if 
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they "are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987). Contrary to Defendant's claim on appeal, Aplt. Brf. at 15 n.3, a defendant 
challenging the trial court's factual findings "ha[s] a judicially imposed obligation to marshal 
the evidence in support of the challenged finding." Id. Therefore, to prevail on a claim of 
clear error, the defendant"' must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence.'" Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 19,100 
P.3d 1177 (citation omitted); accord Worwood, 2007 UT 47, at 112. Defendant has not 
made this showing. 
1. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that the magistrate 
reviewed the affidavits together and was not therefore misled about 
the informant's reliability. 
As noted, the trial court found that the magistrate was not misled as to Lambson's 
reliability because the Teerlink affidavit "was submitted alongside Detective Hardin's 
affidavit, which pointed out that Lambson had been 'detained by Murray Police' regarding 'a 
stolen ring.'" R. 169. The trial court found that the Hardin affidavit thus "dispelled any 
potential false impression" that may have been created by the "concerned citizen" label used 
in the Teerlink affidavit R. 169. Defendant argues that the evidence does not support a 
finding that the magistrate reviewed the affidavits together. Aplt. Brf. at 18-19. His 
argument lacks merit 
15 
Detective Teerlink testified that on December 9,2005, Detective Hardin asked for his 
assistance in obtaining a search warrant for Defendant's residence. See R. 221:22-23. After 
interviewing Lambson at the police station, Detective Teerlink prepared an affidavit in 
support of a warrant to search Defendant's residence. R. 221:25. He also assisted Detective 
Hardin in preparing an affidavit in support of a warrant to search Defendant's father's 
residence, and gave him a copy of his affidavit R. 221:25. Detective Teerlink testified that 
the two affidavits were then submitted to the magistrate "simultaneously." R. 221:26. This 
evidence supports the trial court's finding that the Teerlink affidavit "did not stand alone," 
but that the magistrate "review[ed] both [Detective Teerlink's] and Detective Hardin's 
affidavits together." R. 169. And because the two detectives submitted the affidavits 
simultaneously, the evidence also supports the trial court's finding that Detective Teerlink 
kn[ew] that [the magistrate] would be reviewing both his and Detective Hardin's affidavits 
together." R. 169. 
Defendant contends that the officer's testimony was insufficient to support this 
finding because the detectives could have provided the magistrate "with multiple other 
affidavits as is the common practice," or "the magistrate could have been presented with a 
number of other affidavits," presumably from other officers, "at the same time." Aplt Brf. at 
18. Defendant thus speculates that the "busy magistrate [did] not necessarily . . . connect 
the two affidavits together." AplL Brf. at 18. In a nutshell, Defendant asks this Court to 
reverse the trial court's findings based on speculation. That is no basis for disturbing a trial 
court's factual finding. 
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The evidentiary burden at a Franks hearing rests with the defendant, not the 
prosecutor. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156,172 (holding that defendant must establish falsity 
by a preponderance of the evidence). Accordingly, Defendant's complaint that "[t]he [S]tate 
did not present any further evidence" regarding the circumstances surrounding the obtaining 
of the warrant is misguided. Defendant shouldered that burden. As noted, the evidence 
established that the two detectives submitted the affidavits to the magistrate 
"simultaneously." R. 221:26. Defendant introduced no evidence suggesting that when the 
detectives presented the two affidavits to the magistrate, they also presented other affidavits 
in other cases, or that other officers submitted affidavits. In sum, nothing suggests that the 
magistrate was preoccupied with other matters when she considered the two affidavits. 
Both affidavits identified the same informant, named the same two suspects, and 
related the same facts as to how the informant came into possession of the stolen ring. See 
R. 78-86. And as noted above, both affidavits were presented to the same magistrate at the 
same time. R. 221:26. Under these circumstances, it would "defy reason" to conclude that 
the magistrate issued the warrant for Defendant's home without consideration of the affidavit 
submitted in support of the warrant for Defendant's father's home. State v. Smith, 836 
S.W.2d 137, 140 (Term. Crim. App. 1992) (considering affidavit supporting warrant to 
search house with affidavit supporting warrant for blood sample). The evidence, therefore, 
supports the trial court's finding that the magistrate "review[ed] both... affidavits together." 
R. 169. And because the Hardin affidavit disclosed that Lambson was being " ' detained by 
Murray Police' regarding '[the] stolen ring,'" the evidence also supports the trial court's 
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finding that the Hardin affidavit "dispelled any potential false impression" arguably created 
by the Teerlink affidavit's "concerned citizen" label. R. 169. 
a. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in 
considering both affidavits in determining whether the 
magistrate was misled. 
Defendant argues that in also considering the Hardin affidavit, the trial court 
improperly "relfred] on information outside the four comers of the [Teerlink] affidavit" 
Aplt. Brf. at 19. He contends that "[c]ase law firmly establishes that probable cause must be 
established based on the contents of the affidavit itself." Aplt. Brf. at 19. The cases cited by 
Defendant affirm the general proposition that in assessing whether a warrant was supported 
by probable cause, reviewing courts are "bound by the contents of the affidavit" State v. 
Deluna, 2001UT App 401, f 9,40 P.3d 1136; accord State v. Dable, 2003 UT App 389, f 4, 
81 P.3d 783; State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952,955 n.4 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Weaver, 817 
P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991). These cases do not, however, address the precise issue 
raised here—whether evidence supplied by a contemporaneously submitted affidavit in a 
related investigation can be considered in the probable cause determination. 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "[in] evaluating the showing of 
probable cause necessary to support a search warrant,... [courts] would do well to heed the 
sound admonition [that]... *[t]he Fourth Amendment's commands, like all constitutional 
requirements, are practical and not abstract.'" United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,577 
(1971) (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,108 (1965)). In 
a similar vein, the Tenth Circuit has held that "a magistrate is not constrained by niggardly 
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limitations on his [or her] use of common sense." Kaiser v. Lief, 874 F.2d 732, 734 (10th 
Cir. 1989). A rule that assumes a magistrate acts with "tunnel vision" when reviewing 
contemporaneously submitted affidavits involving the same investigation violates that Fourth 
Amendment principal of common sense. United States v. Fogarty, 663 F.2d 928,930 (9th 
Cir. 1981). 
Adhering to the principal that probable cause determinations should be reviewed in a 
common sense manner, courts that have considered the issue have concluded that a 
reviewing court may properly look to sister affidavits in determining whether a warrant was 
supported by probable cause. See, e.g., Smith, 836 S.W.2d at 139-41 (considering affidavit 
in support of warrant for house search, in addition to affidavit in support of blood draw, in 
concluding that warrant for blood draw was supported by probable cause); Kaiser, 874 F.2d 
at 735 (considering affidavit in support of arrest warrant, in addition to affidavit in support of 
search warrant, in concluding that search warrant was supported by probable cause); 
Fogarty, 663 F.2d at 930 (observing that there is "no restriction which limits a magistrate to 
the four corners of a single affidavit when facts are presented simultaneously in two related 
affidavits seeking two warrants"); United States v. Serao, 367 F.2d 347, 348-50 (2nd Cir. 
1966) (holding that affidavits in support of search warrants for sites in gambling ring could 
be considered in probable cause review of search warrant of another related site), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Piccioli v. United States, 390 U.S. 202 (1968), 
indictment dismissed on remand, 394 F.2d 989 (2nd Cir. 1966); United States v. Nolan, 413 
F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1969) (considering affidavit in support of warrant for house search, in 
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addition to affidavit in support of car search, in concluding that warrant for car search was 
supported by probable cause).2 
The rationale of these cases is compelling. "It would be hypertechnical for the 
[magistrate] not to act upon an entire picture disclosed to him in interrelated affidavits 
presented to him on the same day." Serao, 367 F.2d at 350. Such hypertechnicality is not 
appropriate in probable cause determinations. Id. (citing Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 109). 
Simply put, the Fourth Amendment does not require that magistrates read interrelated 
affidavits with "tunnel vision." Fogarty, 663 F.2d at 930. "Most of these cases do not 
involve any specific reference to the second affidavit in the targeted search warrant or its 
underlying affidavit." Smith, 836 S.W.2d at 140. "[Fjrom a Fourth Amendment perspective, 
the issue is not one of formal reference or incorporation. Instead,... it involves whether or 
not the magistrate had sufficient facts before him, under oath, in affidavit form, to conclude 
that probable cause existed." Id. (citation omitted). 
In sum, where, as here, the facts support a finding that warrant affidavits related to the 
same investigation were reviewed together by the magistrate at the same time, the trial court 
may properly look to both affidavits in determining whether the challenged warrant was 
supported by probable cause. 
2
 In United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit 
refused to consider the officer's testimony that two drug buys referenced in the warrant 
affidavit were recorded, even though that information was provided in five other related 
warrant affidavits. The court did not, however, address the holding in Nolan. 
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t ^ i u aware oi die auspicious circumstances under 
which x^ctiuUdon ^on, - • what happened 
suggested one of thr
 x __ scenarios. Lambson was prevaricate* •; * -' s 
own involvement in the vehicle burglary and theft. Or Lambson was telling the truth, but 
given the circumstances of the purchase, knew that the ring was likely stolen and was thus 
guilty of receiving stolen property. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (West Supp. 2005) 
(providing that a person is guilty of theft if he or she "receives, retains, or disposes of the 
property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been 
stolen"). Or, Lambson was telling the truth, but was naive about the ring's possible origin, 
and thus guilty of nothing. This latter scenario is patently unlikely, given the circumstances 
under which the ring was purchased. In any case, and notwithstanding the conclusory 
labeling of Lambson as a "concerned citizen," the magistrate was presented with sufficient 
facts to independently assess Lambson's reliability. 
Notifying the magistrate that Lambson was actually being "detained" by police as a 
suspect in the case would not have further diminished Lambson's reliability. The affidavit 
did not suggest that Lambson unilaterally approached police and volunteered the 
information, as would a typical citizen informant. Rather, the affidavit revealed that 
Lambson disclosed the information only after he purchased the ring from a drug dealer, was 
caught trying to sell it, and was thereafter questioned by police. R. 79-80. Thus, 
notwithstanding any label given to Lambson, the affidavit "set forth [sufficient] facts and 
circumstances underlying the existence of probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to 
make an independent evaluation of the matter." Franks, 438 U.S. at 165. 
Indeed, whether Detective Teerlink characterized Lambson as a suspect or as a 
concerned citizen was irrelevant to the magistrate's probable cause determination. Use of 
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• *. ./niig . aii;^v;n as a concerned citizen, it thus follows a fortiori that Detective 
Teerlink did not:*~ '»• slniJ ihr iiugisliaU Hull even assuming 
arguendo that the affidavit was somewhat misleading, the evidence does not suggest that 
Detective Teerlink intentionally or recklessly misled the magistrate. The trial court 
implicitly so found. The court found that whereas Detective Teerlink knew the magistrate 
"would be reviewing both his and Detective Hardin's affidavits together," it was "as if 
[Detective Teerlink] defined 'concerned citizen' to mean Gary Lambson, a person of interest 
detained by authorities." R. 169. 
Defendant challenges the court's finding. He argues that because Detective Teerlink 
was concerned that probable cause might not be established without providing the 
informant's name, he provided Lambson's name and intentionally mislabeled him a 
concerned citizen "so as to pass the probable cause test" Aplt. Brf. at 19, 26-27. 
Defendant's argument ignores the record evidence, which was more than sufficient to 
support the finding that Detective Teerlink did not intentionally or recklessly mislead the 
magistrate. 
At the outset, Defendant fails to marshal the evidence, wholly ignoring the evidence 
that supports the trial court's finding. Instead, Defendant "re-argue[s] the factual case [he] 
presented in the trial court,... carefully selecting] facts and excerpts from the record in 
support of [his] position." Chen, 2004 UT 82, at f 78. Defendant's approach does not 
satisfy the marshalling requirement Id. This Court should therefore "assume that the 
evidence supports the trial court's findings" and "affirm [them] on that basis alone." Id. at f 
80. 
24 
Ii i, 111 y i' v i ill, 11 it" dial -I • 'i» 11 fl"' s 111 id ii 114 llial LJelcctiv c" 1 'eerlmk did not act intentionally 
oifrecklt ^ ^ ian"4adequuic evidentiary suppon'" HVJ// #" r, 74-111' ?d m i n 
(quotation and citation omitted). On direct examination, Detective Teerlink testilicd that he 
chan* • -*-" . „ . , ^canse he was not signed up as a 
confidential informant" R. 221:25. Her* ^^r^nMrie^t l iHthe ""i hose "m onceiiinJuli/i ii1" 
rather than 'confidential informant'" beea. ._ ~~\ cr done apv buys with him" 
I ?5 A ^-r Detective Teerlink 
acknowledged that i citizen ^ - . ; . ianmy «, .J 
that he believed Lambson was reliable, defense counsel asked Detective Teerlink whether he 
-:a uie magistrate to view ^n "also as reliable." R. 221: 26-27, Dote Ii c 
Teerlink responded thai he *V:mled llie J oiul I ii" I ;» i I, :il llic uiJoiniutioii [lieJ hud and to 
and make their own J'I ~J»II, yes." R. 221. 27. On re-direct examination Ilii ; 
nmQecutor again asked Detective Teerlink whether he labeled Lambson a concer _ cilizcu 
••i:! *4'-< bnlsli in Ins rrerlihilih in MIL1 I. yos t»! uie (jiicigii ii ill i iiiL Azi .*\\ l ambson 
responds
 &^M ,e and explained that he was simply trying to place Iiini in a ,;„ ategoi y 
that seemed to fit: 
No, I was looking for a name that would fi t He didn't fit the guideline 
that we normally use as a confidential informant. He did not fit in tha t He 
was a citizen. He was giving us information. We weren't making him 
promises; so it was my intent to put him in a - 1 should say a box that seemed 
tofithiminmymind. 
R.221 10, 
In sum, the evidence demonstrated that Detective Teerlink recognized only two 
categories of informants—concerned citizens and confidential informants. Lambson did not 
fit neatly into either category, so Detective Teerlink placed him in the category that he 
believed best fit He chose to label Lambson a concerned citizen because unlike a 
confidential informant, Lambson's name was disclosed to the magistrate and he was 
promised no beneficial treatment in return for his assistance. Detective Teerlink's testimony 
thus supports the trial court's finding that he did not attempt to mislead the magistrate. 
Moreover, the trial court's finding that Detective Teerlink did not intentionally or 
recklessly mislead the magistrate is further buttressed by the process by which the detective 
secured the warrant. As observed by the trial court, Detective Teerlink knew that the 
magistrate would be reviewing the two affidavits together. See R. 169. That fact alone 
suggests that Detective Teerlink was not attempting to mislead the magistrate. Otherwise, he 
would have taken steps to ensure that Detective Hardin did not include the additional facts in 
his affidavit Cf. Frazier, 423 F.3d at 533-36 (holding that even though the officer failed to 
include corroborative information in affidavit necessary for probable cause, his knowledge 
that other contemporaneously submitted affidavits related to the same investigation 
contained that information established the officer's good faith reliance on the magistrate's 
probable cause finding). 
In light of Detective Teerlink's testimony, and the fact he and Detective Hardin 
submitted their affidavits to the magistrate together, the trial court reasonably found that 
Detective Teerlink did not intentionally mislead the magistrate. 
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(quoting Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108). These nonlawyers are not, and cannot, be expected to 
"remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the nature of probable cause." See id. Indeed, 
"[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity... have no proper place in this area.'" Id. 
(quoting Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108). 
The evidence established that Lambson provided his name and address and that he 
was promised nothing in return. As discussed above, those facts are among the 
characteristics found in citizen informants. Under these circumstances, and because the 
labels given to informants are best described as legal terms of art, Detective Teerlink's 
characterization of Lambson as a concerned citizen cannot be considered reckless, much less 
negligent See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 (holding that "[a]llegations of negligence orinnocent 
mistake are insufficient"). 
D. IN ANY EVENT, A MODIFIED WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHES PROBABLE 
CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
Defendant contends that if Teerlink's characterization of Lambson as a "concerned 
citizen" is redacted and Lambson's detention status and the details of his criminal record are 
inserted, the Teerlink affidavit would not establish the requisite probable cause for the search 
warrant Aplt Brf. at 20-36. Because Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the affidavit 
was intentionally or recklessly misleading, this Court may affirm the ruling below without 
reaching this issue. But even assuming otherwise, a modified affidavit would establish 
probable cause nonetheless. 
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|# A modified affidavit would not have materially altered the 
magistrate's perception of the informant 
Defendant contends that Detective Teerlink's characterization of Lambson as a 
"concerned citi/i n " should be reda - 4, JG-27, 35, Such a redaction, 
however, would not have materially a ffr.-ted thp nn '< K* .
 li#:_ m tJie ai lidavil, ' u« 
dfannsed, supra, at 23-26, the facts set forth .. ~*^v*~vit belied the officer's 
„, .„ i-ikl'ijsury labeling oi Laiiibson as a concerned citizen: they clearly disclosed thatLambson 
offered the information » f«i |» i>1«" 'u'|ui. slumed |«) police uhui lie J i i c m p t e d t o s e l l t h e 
stolen ring at th
 rf ___re. See R. 79-80. In other words, despite the conclnsory label, 
n accurate picture of Lambson 's involvement in the case, including his 
Teerlink affidavit should have 
In I IIL-J Liimbsoi'i in connection with his possession of the i k !k i ii, n; AplL Brf. at 23-27, us 
did the HardinalTi'luvil we R KJ-H''-!, IJ'ul tuiilJiiry to Defendant 's claim on appeal, such a 
disclosure co~*~ 
generally recognized that an informant"s ref is nf 
• hsclosed ifCCinr iv i . ^ «w.,.umuL-R . H I ....ttn> 4f the information proves 
false. Seg, e.g., Gates * 462 U.S. at ^ J _ 
(Uta&App 1997), abrogated on othe- ._._ ^ , - j ' j t uT iU5,104r.ju 
'^ . a / r.5a 81 c '*th Cir. 2005). The reliability of an 
informant is e v e further l _ ^0 rwij ,mg u*e 
investigation of the
 a ~ ^ n . If set free,'the informant ma v - ' - il • v a 
i  
nevertheless evade later apprehension for giving a false report. But if the informant is in 
police custody, he can be under no such illusion. The informant would know that giving a 
false report will only aggravate his lot, not mitigate it. 
Finally, Defendant claims that the affidavit should have included Lambson's criminal 
history. Aplt. Brf. at 32-36. The affidavit in fact disclosed that Lambson had a criminal 
history, but did not detail that history. See R. 80 (indicating that Lambson 'lias provided... 
his name, date of birth and criminal history"). Disclosure of those details would not have 
materially affected Lambson's credibility. At the time of the warrant application, 
Defendant's criminal history would have revealed a relatively minor criminal record: 
Case No. Date Filed Charges Disposition 
011100414 (WJ) 2001 Jan 25 Disorderly Conduct Dismissed 
Alcohol Cons. By Minor Guilty 
Criminal Mischief Dismissed 
011300437 FS (Tooele) 2001 Nov 29 Aggravated Assault Dismissed 
035801161 (Bountiful) 2003 May 01 Improper Lane Change Guilty 
No Insurance Guilty 
051903651 FS (SLC) 2005 Jun 10 Altering Prescription Dismissed 
R. 63-64. Knowledge of these details would not have diminished Lambson's credibility any 
more than would the general knowledge that he in fact had a criminal history. 
Defendant asserts that his criminal history also would have revealed that he was 
facing charges for felony theft and misdemeanor criminal mischief, allegedly occurring in 
3
 The details of Lambson's criminal history were alleged in Defendant's motion to 
suppress, which provided the court case numbers. See R. 63-64. The court dockets, as found 
on the Utah State Court XChange System, confirm that history. 
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November 2564. ,' „ | > 11 1 11 „ 11 ,l» I - * I"11,' si , 11m jj.es, h o w e v e r , w e r e no t fi led unt i l m o r e 
tt^antwoeioE ,e warrant application was made in this case. 
Qise 061700233 F<! '* ,:ond District at 
http- ''.'• - w ts.go v* fca - • inal mischief 
0 _ i , therefore, could not not have u ^ ^ magistrate. 
2. Despite the proposed redactions and insertions, there remains a 
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. 
DefenJui il m JL,IIC& that because Lanil nm tvas not a cil I lunl *i'1; *nv • ; 
reliability, police were required "to a »r««4"»«»:^ v | >^s | -iJlejjjlit »«>«" •( ciieiiiial conduct«»r any 
'" dminating aspects of the tip" in order to establish probable cause. Aplt Brf. at 31,27 '}9, 
in jeieiidant" s argument lacks merit 
In State * Saddler l i ^ m i My rigia test thai * v< mi i <i 
'zrKaysville Cm . Si ^ , . -; J P.2d231 (Utah App. ±^97V Under tho Muh nhy ksl,,.< 
it ™n an informant's tip could supply the basis for a probable cause ^ ^& 
.nil w uiidiilt:, i !JI die informant gave enough detail about fee 
y, and ( J , ^ ^ v independently corroh it -' *K* 
AC Tn~~ TTt;^ Supreme Court eond lis test was ?LL! ^.^v* ,u 
i . w cause G^ieirmL^ H tA X T ~ * : ~ g t h a t i t h a d 
:LbL
 ; emt« ^ ijates flexible tota":*" *r *x < >***-•-
explained that "'an informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are but two relevant 
* Court XChange also discloses that all of th ese charges wer e d i siiii ssed i»11!" I ,: 1" • 
28, 2006. 
considerations, among others, in determining the existence of probable cause under ca 
totality-of-the-circumstances.,,, Id. at U 11 (citation omitted). The Court emphasized that 
such factors '"are not strict, independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. A 
weakness in one or the other is not fatal to the warrant so long as in the totality there is 
substantial basis to find probable cause.'" Id. (quoting Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130). 
Defendant proposes a test that requires police to pigeon-hole informants into either an 
"inherently reliable" category or '^ unreliable" category. And if the informant falls within the 
former category, police must then independently corroborate the illegal activity. See AplL 
Brf. at 27-36. Such a rigid test flatly contradicts the totality-of-the-circumstances standard 
articulated in both Gates and Saddler. When a warrant affidavit relies on information from 
an informant, the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are relevant 
factors, among others, in determining probable cause. Id. at 230; Saddler, 2004 UT 105, at I 
11. Other relevant factors include the detail provided by the informant about the alleged 
criminal activity, as well as any independent police corroboration. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, at 
f l 8-10 & n.l. These factors, however, "'are not strict, independent requirements to be 
rigidly exacted in every case. A weakness in one or the other is not fatal to the warrant so 
long as in the totality there is substantial basis to find probable cause.'" Id. (quoting Hansen, 
732 P.2d at 130) (emphasis added). 
As noted, redaction of the "conerned citizen" label and insertion of Lambson's 
detention status and criminal history would not have painted a different picture of Lambson. 
Therefore, despite these modifications, there remains "a 'substantial basis for . . . 
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cdticludprig]* (M pi '\h\\hW ITMIS- existed,""" Uates\ 462 I i.S. at 238-3^ ^ u , 
Unit _ _ .S . 257, 271 (I960)). 
Admittedly, T — ^ o n ' s reliability was not that >f a disinterested party who was 
-, u
 v . - r - - - . . . . . . . . * . - - *r/- ?000UT 
App 2 3 , 1 2 8 , 996 P.2d 555. He was cai::*1 * • * ilni i i' i ill pmvulnJ illliln 
information after police responded to the jewelry store and questioned Mm about Ms 
possessH m of ill1, iiiji v.wvwi, L :^r criminal history R, 63-64 
U nder these circumstances l~ nayverv .^pu^iDi-: 
m iiflin'ii' See McArthur, 2000 UT App 25, at f 31 (observing that informants who % u 
dUi v ity generally are not as reliable as a disinterested citi / < n 
*'*•• '"' ' 36(same). AJthou«'i n» ^ 
«, ircunistances raised concerns about the reliability of Ms information at the very outset, those 
concerns were adequately mitigated by other factors. 
a. The magistrate reasonably relied on the information provided by 
the informant because it was a detailed, first-hand account. 
• Lambson's information did not come second-hand, but was a personal, detailed 
is of contraband at 
DefeniJiiiil : housu Lambson explained that he met with Defendant's fnilF11 •l"" ,hi} ,M 
then traveled to Defendant's residence; that Defendant's father retrieved a ba^ . . J V M
 V JU ; M 
line iTKiileficc:; thai I»IH r (iinr I unit _
 t 5s in the bag for fifty 
dollars; and that Defendant's fattier , 11 ^ k-pt *d«* 1 
the bag at Defendant's residence. R. 79. Additionally, Lambson stated that wMle at the 
residence, he saw "two large bags of marijuana and a triple beam scale" on a table in a back 
room. R. 79. He added that one of the bags contained "chronic" marijuana and the other 
contained lower grade marijuana. R. 79. Thus, "even if we entertain some doubt as to 
[Lambson's] motives, [his] explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along 
with [his] statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight 
than might otherwise be the case." Gates, 462 U.S. at 234. 
b. The magistrate reasonably relied on the information provided by 
the informant because he provided the information under 
circumstances which held him criminally accountable. 
In addition, Lambson was known to police, further enhancing his reliability because 
he could be held criminally accountable for his claims. See Gates* 462 U.S. at 233-34; 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235 n.2; May, 399 F.3d at 824-25. Moreover, he was specifically told 
by Detective Teerlink that "if he lied ... in any way about the investigation,... [Detective 
Teerlink] would charge him for false information and interfering in an investigation." R. 
221:23,28-29. Such a warning further enhances Lambson5 s reliability. See United States v. 
Figueroa, 720 F.2d 1239,1244 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that information from informant 
reliable in part because "the informant was explicitly told that he would be subject to 
criminal prosecution . . . if he knowingly and willfully gave false information"). And, as 
discussed, Lambson was detained at the police station during the execution of the warrants, 
where he remained until after the search warrants had been executed and Defendant and his 
father had been detained. R. 221: 24, 26. The warning of criminal charges for providing 
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false information, MMI|»ICII uuiiii ins »iiniM^irrt 0^\?r)^ n, hi 'Inr mlianied Lambson's 
reliability. See SMJ i , a u j . 
Defe counters that the prospect of misdemeanor charges for giving false 
information w* because . ..-
 t ree felony 
charges" for trying to sell the stolen rinf A ~1 * **-
ie fair market value of the stolen ring, which was purchased for only fifty dollars. 
i^ j - .1 nn was facing felony or misde 
See Utah Code Ann. K "£: l * 
information charge would add to his criminal y nonetheless and thus operate as a 
detail ciil lo lyii%«, Moreover, i son was "presumably motivated to provide information 
after Ms [detention] out of hope th ' ! • . .siting VVVPUI 1 iVMill in ujuie Iciuenl Ih'.ilment 
rhiiiiNelfbytheautho Id iiot achieve thai goal if he gave false infor-vif. 
.' jircumstances in which he provided the information further served, to corrob» 
reliability." United Stntt>\ i« Pahivan \ in i i uil b vi I'M, DID (ytnUr. 2004) f nmhson 
louki , ill) cjiiticiicli iiiiJL ^ ^ **weper trouble with authorities if he fabricated the story 
c. The magistrate reasonably relied on the information provided by 
the informant because his account constituted an admission 
against penal interest. 
In addition, Lambson's account to police also amounted to a statement asain i 
minimi, which bolstered his reliability further. See Saddler, 2004 UT 105, at f l 18-1 ^ 
Defendant argues, however '.amksi • '«'»' "luilfial. i v ildtcmu—*,:A/U •* oocordeJ 
enhanced relic ^ iie was caught in criminal wrong J »vino mng 
more than what police already knew. Aplt. Brf. at 24. Although the informant in Saddler 
admitted to additional wrongdoing, the Utah Supreme Court did not make that a condition 
for according enhanced reliability to statements against penal interest. See id. at f l 18-20. 
Nor should it be such a condition. 
While an admission to additional criminal conduct would, undoubtedly, further 
enhance an informant's credibility, such additional admissions are not necessary to constitute 
a statement against penal interest. Lambson could have claimed that he found the ring or 
received it as a gift, thus admitting nothing. Instead, he admitted that he bought it under 
circumstances that would demonstrate he likely knew the ring was stolen. That statement 
against his penal interest could only bolster the reliability of the information he provided. 
Saddler, 2004 UT 105, at f l 18-19. 
One noted commentator addressed the common objection, made by Defendant here, 
Aplt Brf. at 25-26, "that for 'the criminal caught red-handed' there is 'litde additional risk of 
oppobrium' attendant admitting what the police already know." Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.3(c), at 139 (4th ed. 2004) (citation 
and footnote omitted). It is argued that such persons have nothing to lose by making the 
statements, and therefore, "there is no basis for concluding that [their] information 
concerning the involvement of others or the location of the fruits of the crime is reliable." 
Id. But as concluded by LaFave, this reasoning is faulty: 
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[OJne who already knows the police are in a position to charge him with a 
serious crime will not lightly undertake to divert the police down blind alleys. 
Thus, where the circumstances fairly suggest that the informant 'well knew 
that any discrepancies in his story might go hard with him,' that is reason for 
finding the information reliable, in such a situation, it is the cclearly 
apprehended threat of dire police retaliation should he not produce accurately * 
more so than the admission of criminal conduct which produces the requisite 
indicia of reliability. 
fa. s 159-40 (citafc footnotes omitted), 
-wogiu-r--
 fciii Ow -at- irt *ue Supreme Court said of 
accomplice accusations in another contrat 'ably suspect 
given the recognized motivation to shit u others/" Id. at 139 (quoting Bruton v. 
i* mh'ti States, Jn i m *-3 {i 908)). LaFave recognized that this is "a legitimate cause for 
WWXJLIA. ** '* nut noted lliiJiffhr danger is less, in lint1 in I on nant setting "than in the at-trial setting 
<K'h the Court J , f : aking.M Id. iUFor one thing, a fabrication of false accusations 
.vi involve others in one's criminal activities is less likely to occur on the spur of 
uic mrmcrt 4>)11(nui'ii'ii? urrwt tlnii (i in ii IIIJIIMJ <)ci.asiijii J.' ALCOIII i| I's, it may be 
stated ; i (JIUJJ uuLon that a 'spontaneous' admi&M' . --st penal interest is m n» 
deserving of reliance." Id, 
d. The magistrate reasonably relied on the information provided by 
Hie informant because it was consistent with Defendant's 
criminal history 
s allegations against Defendant was 
Defknocmi <> A^U * involving . tht1; lis including an Aggravated Burglary 
on 02/26/2000, n*. irug charges (the most recent on 05/12/05) :md Strong Ann 
Kobbery on 1U/U.V I"l K 80 That history at least "reduced the i IUII-LI^ of a reckless or 
prevaricating tale." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960), overruled on other 
grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). As observed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Jones, a history of related offenses makes an informant's "charge against 
[the target] much less subject to scepticism than would be such a charge against one without 
such a history." Id. This Court's suggestion to the contrary in State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 
644 (Utah App. 1993), is inconsistent with Jones. See also Ybarra v. Illinois, AAA U.S. 85, 
93 (1979) (rejecting claim that officers had basis to conduct a weapons frisk where officers 
"neither recognized [defendant] as a person with a criminal history nor had any particular 
reason to believe that he might be inclined to assault them" and did not see him give any 
"indication of possessing a weapon"); Brinegarv. United States, 338 U.S 160,169-78(1949) 
(considering defendant's history of running liquor in determining probable cause). 
'To be sure,... a prior criminal history is by itself insufficient to create reasonable 
suspicion" or probable cause. United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120,1132 (10th Cir. 2005). 
However, "in conjunction with other factors, criminal history contributes powerfully to the 
. . . calculus." Id:, accord United States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106, 1114 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that "criminal history, combined with other factors, can support a finding of 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause"). Many courts have recognized that both prior 
convictions and prior arrests may be relevant to the issue of probable cause. See LaFave, § 
3.2(d) at 58-59 & nn. 134-35. Of course, convictions are more probative than arrests. Id. at 
61. And the probative weight of a criminal record will be greater the closer it relates to the 
subject crime and the closer it is in time to the warrant application. Id. 
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Because liip rttTicktvif tine »u 1113 m u ak'H m is Liic u 11 miMl history is Jess probative 
th^nhad •—womv oi uiose arrests. I*J 
occurred five years previously and beyond, but were very similar in kind, involving thefts. 
A us-;fi<uru ,/. .iowever, was within seven months. While perhaps not 
as strong, ~*^ xxxxoimation added to ih<~ pn hiiblr c-ausp shnv 
* # # 
u 1 uie affidavit was sufficient to establish probable 
cause.' As the uicu >, *>asis foi I'i ruling probable cause existed I n <%ame; 
(1) the affidavit "conta
 : ^ l of [tliej transaction at [Defendant' s | resirlnii T 
IIIIIII 1 olh i i i g t h e pui I I 1 ii'iJIy stolen merchandise,'* (2) the affidavit "contained r"" 
accour:* ' *L . . . . >, type, and Iocat; 
(3) "the ives knew Lambson's identity and di^clu ' 
all icia v it re\ that "Lambson obtained his information first-hand," and (i , u 
• • v ^ h l ihti I ,ar:tkson lkv'v . lliii^lo stand behinaL^jLi; being threatened 
r n ^ *: i^ xxx^ v* wutto be false."' R . 1 69 
the trial court's ruling. 
n. 
THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES SUPPRESSION OF THE 
EVIDENCE REGARDLESS OF PROBABLE CAUSE BECAUSE THE 
AFFIANT DID NOT INTENTIONALLY OR RECKLESSLY MAKE A 
FALSE STATEMENT OR OMIT MATERIAL INFORMATION 
In his second point on appeal, Defendant argues that the Utah Constitution requires 
suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant whenever it can be shown that the 
warrant affidavit was intentionally or recklessly misleading, Aplt. Brf. at 39-47. Defendant 
contends that unlike Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, suppression is required under the 
Utah Constitution, even if the misrepresentation does not materially affect the probable cause 
finding. Aplt Brf. at 43-47. 
A. THIS COURT NEED NOT AND SHOULD NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S STATE 
EXCLUSIONARY CLAIM BECAUSE HE HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE 
AFFIDAVIT WAS INTENTIONALLY OR RECKLESSLY MISLEADING. 
Defendant's state constitutional claim rests on the premise that Detective Teerlink 
intentionally or recklessly misled the magistrate. As explained, the evidence supports the 
trial court's finding that the affidavit was not misleading and that Detective Teerlink did not 
act intentionally or recklessly in characterizing Lambson as a concerned citizen or in 
omitting Lambson's criminal history and detention status. Accordingly, this Court need not 
and should not reach Defendant's state constitutional claim. See State v. Emmet, 839 P.2d 
781, 786 (Utah 1992) (refusing to reach remaining issues where another resolves appeal, 
unless remaining issues may arise on retrial). 
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& INANYEVKN DOES NOT REQUIRE EXCLUSION OF 
EVIDENCE. 
Even on its merits, however, Defendant's state constitutional argument lacks merit 
Defendant conlei ids ll, JI lllali s exclusionary rale requires suppression whenever an officer 
intentionally or recklessly misstates or omits facts in llie witfinnf affidavit, "regardless ol (its 
effect on] probable cause." Aplt Brf. at 43. He argues "'that exclusion in such cases is 
required undei Uie state c™1^* * eeause Article T ° '* " ' provides greater 
protections than does the Four . . : , _ 
x,
~ historical backgii iiiil of the Utah Constitution, and case law from other nn 
lie plui ml I niton ill .Larocco and dicta in Nielsen, Defendant anzi* 
tviucii^e shnrlr' ,.vi * probable cau^\ 10 vindicate Utah residents for 
nduct and violation of their persur. s i -
43-4/ 9s argument is unavailing. 
- - ^
r
 • . . consti tiilio 11" I" 1,11 w\\ 11 be construed in light of 
their £ramers* intent."' American Fork v. Cro - ^ ;* -
discerning that intent, the Utah Supreme Court has cor . _ . ~^ ty of source. < c 
• Parting point," uf i um • J aJvva;. . * v ,hc piaih nooning of the textual languag 
American Bush v. City • wuuiju.ltLake, *"**' f (Durham, C J , 
concurring in part an ;enting in part); accord State v. Tiedemanm, ~ j v , J T 49, f 37,162 
mguage of the provision is inadequate to discern the Cramers' 
^ U n t , i h e C o u r t lid ' llm i i i l l i i i iui i L I I III i hl ' i l iui i .il il nil LL ii"I lliu pjOVLSIOil, 
Nimilar provisions in __al and sister state constitutions, llie official rqv,n I I •> 't.ih s 
constitutional convention, statutory law in effect at the time of the convention, relevant 
historical state traditions, and other related state constitutional provisions. See Crosgrove, 
701 P.2d at 1072; West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 R2d 999,1015 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Robertson, 924 P.2d 889,891-92 (Utah 1996); P.I.E. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 
759 P.2d 1144,1148 (Utah 1988). In a few cases, the Court has also indicated a willingness 
to consider "policy arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials." Soc 'y of 
Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916,921 n.6 (Utah 1993); Tiedemann, 2007 UT 
49, at f 37. 
The Court in Whitehead explained that "[e]ach of these types of evidence can help in 
divining the intent and purpose of the framers, a critical aspect of any constitutional 
interpretation." Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 921 n.6 (emphasis added). In other words, despite 
its expressed willingness to look at non-textual or non-historical evidence, Whitehead, like 
its progenitors, viewed "divining the intent and purpose of the framers" as the ultimate 
purpose for looking at those sources. But see Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, at \ 2>1 (holding that 
courts may "rely on whatever assistance legitimate sources may provide in the interpretive 
process," but not limiting that review to divining the intent of the framers). As explained by 
Justice Durrant in American Bush, such an approach "is the most appropriate interpretive 
course to follow when confronted with constitutional questions." American Bush, 2006 UT 
40, at 1 86 (Durrant, J., concurring). It "provides stability to state government while 
remaining true to the principle that it is the people of this state who should ultimately 
determine how our society should be structured." Id. at \ 84; accord Paul G. Cassell, The 
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Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: 
The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751,774-80 (1993) (endorsing an 'Tiistorically-based" 
approach that incorporates neutral principles). 
In dicta, the Utah Supreme Court has observed that Section 14 "often provides greater 
protections than the Fourth Amendment, despite nearly identical language." State v. 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 16,164 P.3d 397. In reality, however, the Court has found greater 
protections only on rare occasions. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415,418 (Utah 
1991) (holding that section 14 recognizes a privacy interest in bank records); State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (concluding that police were required 
to obtain warrant before opening door of stolen car to inspect the VIN).5 This case should 
not be added to that select list. 
The plain language of Section 14 is not aimed at punishing police for misconduct, but 
rather at ensuring that warrants be based "upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation." Utah Const, art I, § 14. Thus, even assuming arguendo that Detective 
Teerlink intentionally or recklessly misled the magistrate as to an immaterial fact, Defendant 
still received everything to which he was entitled under Section 14: a search based on 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. While a willful, but immaterial, 
misrepresentation in an affidavit might constitute a fraud on the court, it does not 
5
 In State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32,996 P.2d 546, the Court analyzed an administrative 
traffic checkpoint under the Utah Constitution, but adopted the approach taken by the United 
States Supreme Court. 
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unconstitutionally infringe upon a defendant's privacy interests, because the search satisfies 
the requirements of Section 14. 
Moreover, the historical events preceding the adoption of the Utah Constitution, i.e., 
the antipolygamy raids, do not support the proposition that the framers included Section 14 
"to provide Utahns with additional protection" beyond the Fourth Amendment, as argued by 
Defendant. Aplt. Brf. at 40-41. The complaint of Utah's settlers was not that the Fourth 
Amendment was inadequate, but that it was disregarded. See generally Tracey E. Panek, 
Search and Seizure in Utah: Recounting the Antipolygamy Raids; 64 Utah Hist. Qtly 316-34 
(1994). Thus, when adopting the Utah Constitution, the framers included a declaration of 
rights patterned after the federal Bill of Rights. See Utah Const, art. I. Although the framers 
looked to the 44 other state constitutions in drafting a declaration of rights, "[t]he inspiration 
behind the declaration of rights came from the great parent bill of rights framed by the 
fathers of our country." 1 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention 
102 (Star Printing Co. 1898); 2 Official Report 1847. 
Where the framers found the federal rights lacking in clarity or substance, they 
modified them. See, e.g. Utah Const, art. I, § 4 (detailing principles of separation of church 
and state), § 9 (adding unnecessary rigor clause), § 6 (clarifying that right to bear arms is for 
security and defense, but may be regulated), § 10 (identifying number of jurors and 
proportion required for a verdict), § 12 (adding right to appeal and spousal privilege), § 15 
(detailing free speech right), § 22 (adding that private property may not be damaged without 
just compensation). Others rights they left relatively untouched. See, e.g. Utah Const, ait I, 
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§ 5 (tracking language in U.S. Const, art. I, § 9, cl. 2), § 7 (tracking Fourteenth Amendment), 
§ 14 (tracking Fourth Amendment). As to those, it reasonably can be assumed that the 
framers intended they be accorded the same meaning as their federal counterpart. See Paul 
G. Cassell, Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: The Irrelevance of the 
Antipoligamy Raids, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 1,2-10 (1995). Indeed, the language of Section 5 
was expressly modified to track the language of article I, section 9 of the United States 
Constitution, so that it would not be considered "in a different way." 1 Official Proceedings 
257. Because Section 14 is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, this Court should 
presume that Section 14 mirrors the Fourth Amendment unless there is evidence to suggest it 
provides greater protections (interstitial approach utilizing a mirroring presumption). 
Although the interstitial approach to state constitutional interpretation supports the 
conclusion that Section 14 rights are coterminous with Fourth Amendment rights, the same 
cannot be said with respect to the remedy for a violation of those rights. In Larocco, a 
plurality concluded that "exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence 
of police violations of article I, section 14." Larocco,19A P.2d at 460. But several factors 
dictate against that conclusion. First, the language of Section 14 does not call for exclusion 
of evidence. See Utah Const, art. I, § 14; Cassell, The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. at 
807-12. Second, most states at the time did not impose an exclusionary rule. Cassell, The 
Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. at 800-05. Third, the common law did not embody an 
exclusionary rule. See id. at 806-07. Fourth, the first Utah legislature did not require 
exclusion of evidence for unreasonable searches and seizures, but imposed criminal 
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sanctions instead. See id. at 809-12. And fifth, the prevailing traditions of the time do not 
support exclusion. See id. at 812-14, 819-22. While this Court may not overrule the Utah 
Supreme Court's adoption of a state exclusionary rule, the historical context of Section 14 
does not provide a basis for the Court to extend the exclusionary rule, as requested by 
Defendant. 
Sound policy reasons also factor against exclusion under these circumstances. The 
exclusionary rule imposes "harsh consequences" on society, "excluding relevant evidence of 
illegal activity at trial." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, f 13, 76 P.3d 1159. The 
exclusionary rule thus frustrates "[t]he real objective in criminal proceedings, of seeking out 
the truth and doing justice." State v. Bray, 30 Utah 2d 121,124,514 P.2d 537,539 (Utah 
1973). Accordingly, it should only be applied "where its benefit as a deterrent promises to 
outweigh the societal cost of its use." Franks, 438 U.S. at 166; accord State v. Worwood, 
2007 UT 47, f 44,164 P.3d 397. As recently observed by the United States Supreme Court, 
"the value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden 
act." Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006). Officers have little incentive to 
misrepresent or omit facts that are immaterial to the probable cause determination. And 
where suppression is certain to result if the facts misrepresented or omitted are material to 
the probable cause determination, officers will be loathe to risk the harsh remedy of 
exclusion when they are in doubt about materiality. "Viewed from this perspective, 
deterrence of [such misrepresentations] is not worth a lot." Id. The risk of contempt of court 
proceedings or internal discipline should be more than sufficient to deter immaterial 
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misrepresentations. Because the societal costs of excluding evidence under these 
circumstances "far outweigh any possible benefits to deterrence," Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 
431,446 (1984), this Court should reject Defendant's state constitutional argument6 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
Defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted March 24, 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
sistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
6
 Drawing the line at materiality also comports with the principle that police should be 
put "'in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or 
misconduct had occurred.'" Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, at f 13 (quoting Mr, 467 U.S. at 443) 
(other citations omitted). 
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T-earliiJo "DEFENSE COPT 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That your affiant has reason to believe that on the premises known as 849 North Sir Phillip 
Drive, further described as a single family residence constructed of brown brick, tan siding and 
brown trim. The residence is the seventh structure south of 900 North. The residence is located 
on the west side of Sir Phillip Drive and faces to the east. The front door is green in color with a 
black metal screen door. The numbers 849 are clearly printed on the left side of the front door 
and are brown in color. And all rooms, attics, basements, and other parts therein and the 
surrounding grounds and any garages, storage rooms, and outbuildings of any kind located upon 
the curtilage of the residence. 
*o" 
In the City of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, There is now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
Jewelry, further described as a "pave" diamond ring designed with yellow and white gold. The 
ring also has a large number of small diamonds. It is described by the owner as a custom "one of 
a kind" ring, (see attached list of jewelry and drawing). 
Jewelry, further described as a blue turquoise stretch bracelet (see attached list of jewelry) 
Jewelry, further described as miscellaneous jewelry stolen in a vehicle burglary at 145 West 
Pierpont Avenue on 11/5/2005. (see attached list of jewelry) 
Marijuana, further described as a green leafy substance; material related to the possession or 
distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, measuring devices; and drug paraphernalia 
described as rolling papers or pipes used for smoking marijuana. 
Articles of personal property tending to establish and document sales of stolen jewelry and a 
controlled substance including U.S. currency, buyer and seller lists, and other documentation of 
sales of stolen jewelry and controlled substances; articles tending to establish the identity of 
persons in control of the premises sought to be searched including rent receipts, utility receipts, 
cl 
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and addressed envelopes, and any other Suits or instrumentality's of the crimes of possession or 
distribution of stolen jewelry and controlled substances. 
And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has 
been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it 
as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes 
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct 
Your affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of 
Possession of Stolen Property, Possession and or Distribution of a Controlled Substance. 
THE FACTS TO ESTABLISH THE GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH 
WARRANT ARE: 
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City Police Officer and has been a police officer for over 5 years. 
Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City Police Department's Narcotic Unit and 
investigates narcotic related offenses. Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and 
in the investigation of narcotic related offenses through the Utah Police Academy and the 
California Narcotics Association. Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA 
Clandestine Laboratory Course. Your affiant has worked street level drug interdiction as an 
arresting officer and as an undercover police officer. Your affiant has seen several different types 
of narcotics during these operations. Your affiant has been involved with over 400 drug related 
cases, many of which were felonies. 
Within the last 6 hours your affiant has received information from a concerned citizen named 
Gary Lambson. Mr. Lambson stated that there is stolen jewelry at the address of 849 North Sir 
Phillip Drive. He also stated that the individuals who reside or otherwise occupy 849 North Sir 
Phillip Drive are engaging in an ongoing narcotics distribution operation. 
On 12/6/05 Mr. Lambson met with Daniel V. Keener for the purpose of buying jewelry. Daniel 
V. Keener traveled with Mr. Lambson to 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. Mr. Lambson was told 
that this was Daniel V. Keener's son's residence. The son is named Daniel Lee Keener. Inside 
the residence Daniel V. Keener retrieved a bag of jewelry. Mr. Lambson said the bag contained 
rings, necklaces, watches and bracelets. Mr. Lambson purchased a ring for $50 from Daniel V. JjJ 
Keener. Mr. Lambson said Daniel V. Keener put some of the jewelry in his pocket and left most . /$tf^*& 
of the jewelry in the bag at the listed residence. ^fdjj^ 
While in the residence of 849 North Sir Phillip Drive, Mr. Lambson observed the following 
items on a table in a back room; two large bags of marijuana and a triple beam scale. He said 
one of the bags contains chronic marijuana. Chronic is high quality marijuana. The other bag 
contains lower grade marijuana. Mr. Lambson said that Daniel Lee Keener is selling the 
marijuana out of the listed residence. 
On 12/8/05 Mr..Lambson took the ring he purchased to Mike's Custom Jewelry and Repair at 
254 East 6400 South for the purpose of selling it The clerk at Mike's Jewelry recognized the 
ring as the one that belongs to another employee of Mike's Jewelry named Julie Baker. Mrs. 
Baker identified the ring to be a custom made ring that was stolen out of her vehicle along with 
n^ 
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other jewelry on 11/5/05 at 145 West Pieipont Avenue (Salt Lake City case number 05-193011). 
The police responded to Mike's Jewelry and questioned Mr. Lambson. 
Your affiant showed Mr. Lambson the list of Jewelry stolen during the previously mentioned 
vehicle burglary. Mr. Lambson identified a yellow and white gold diamond ring and a Blue 
turquoise stretch bracelet as items he saw in Daniel V Keener bag of jewelry at the listed 
residence. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the concerned citizen to be accurate and 
reliable because: 
The concerned citizen, Gary Lambson, has provided your affiant with his name, date of birth and 
criminal history. Your affiant informed Mr. Lambson that if he gave your affiant any false 
information he would be charged with interfering with an investigation. 
Your affiant has checked police and state records and found that Daniel V Keener has been 
arrested numerous times for Possession of a Controlled Substance, the most recent arrest was on 
5/5/2002. He was also arrested for Carrying a Loaded Fire Arm in a Vehicle on 6/30/89. Your 
affiant has also found that Daniel Lee Keener's drivers license shows the address of 849 North 
Sir Phillip Drive. Daniel Lee Keener has been arrested for numerous thefts including an 
Aggravated Burglary on 02/26/2000, numerous drug charges (the most recent on 05/12/05) and 
Strong Arm Robbery on 10/05/91. 
Your affiant desires to enter 849 North Sir Phillip Drive and search for stolen jewelry, marijuana, 
marijuana paraphernalia and other items related to the distribution of marijuana. The 
paraphernalia includes such items as pipes, bongs or tubes used to inhale or smoke marijuana. 
Other related items include packaging material used to package marijuana and scales used to 
weigh quantities. Your affiant knows from training and experience that these items are almost 
always found on the premises where search warrants for controlled substances have been 
executed. 
Your affiant desires to search for records of stolen jewelry and marijuana sales, both written and 
electronic, residency papers and U.S. currency. Your affiant knows from past experiences with 
narcotic investigations that persons sometimes record their sales to show dates, amounts 
purchased and drug indebtedness. Your affiant knows from training and experience that stolen 
jewelry and marijuana is sold for U.S. currency. The concerned citizen purchased the stolen ring 
with U.S. currency. 
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for presentation to the court 
by Deputy District Attorney $/^/fc H'J^S . 
"WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items 
any time day or night because there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good reasons to wit: 
6^-yO 
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YoxiT affiant knows from training and experience that persons who sell stolen property or 
narcotic distribution operation do not keep regular business hours and commonly sell at night 
Daniel V Keener sold the concerned citizen the stolen ring at night 
The residence your affiant desires to search is located in a residential community. Your affiant 
feels that it would be safe for children who may live in the area as well as the other residents of 
the neighborhood if the warrant were to be served in the evening hours, during a time when the 
pedestrian traffic around the neighborhood is less. 
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested search warrant not be required to 
give notice of the officer's authority or purpose because: 
Physical harm may result to any person if notice was given, and/or the property sought may 
quickly be destroyed, disposed of, or secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
Daniel V Keener has been arrested for carrying a loaded firearm in a Vehicle. Daniel Lee 
Keener has been arrested for Aggravated Burglary and Strong Arm Robbery. Your affiant feels 
it would be safer for officers serving the warrant and persons inside the residence if police 
officers ware not required to give notice before entering the residence. 
Detective ifoug Teerlink 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this . i day of 
t-
dge of the Third 
, District Court 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
that on the premises known as 1381 South Emery Street, a single family dwelling, located on the 
east side of Emery and feces to the west It is the third structure south of Utahna and is brown 
brick, with white shutters. The front door is brown with a white screen door. The numbers 
413 8 r are black and painted on the front stairs; to include all rooms, attics, basements, and other 
parts therein and the surrounding grounds and any garages, storage rooms, and outbuildings of 
any kind located upon the curtilage of the property. 
And on the person known as Daniel Vern Keener a white male adult D.O.B. 05-19-1954, 
approximately 5'10" and 190 pounds with grey hair, 
In the City of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, there is now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
An Anne Klein wrist watch described as a silver colored watch with a black face, with the name 
of 'Anne Klein' printed on the face, 
And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has 
been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it 
as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes 
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct 
Your affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of 
Burglary and Possession of Stolen Property. 
THE FACTS TO ESTABLISH THE GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH 
WARRANT ARE: 
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City Police Officer and has been a police officer for over 9 years. 
Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City Police Department's Burglary Unit and 
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investigates burglary and theft related offenses. Your affiant has had training which includes the 
Utah police Academy, and other POST certified investigative training, which included training 
concerning property crimes. 
Your affiant was contacted by Mimay^City*Detectives^a)ncerning *a -person -detained Jgr 
possession of a ring which was taken during a vehicle burglary in Salt Lake City on November 6, 
2005. At the time of this burglary a large amount of jewelry was taken inducing a Anne Klein 
watch, a Pave diamond rin& a Tifiany necklace with Tiffany* inscribed on the necklace and 
matching bracelet, a Omega yellow gold necklace, a diamond yellow gold tennis bracelet, a 
diamond cross necklace in white gold, turquoise necklace blue with small brown beads, red and 
silver earrings, an antique white gold ring with a pink sapphire stone, a silver and pink ring with 
cubic zirconias, a blue and silver ring with cubic zirconias, and yellow gold diamond stud 
earrings. 
Other property taken in the burglary include the victims clothing, Ipod mp3 player, Louis 
Vuitton bags, 'Mac' makeup, Louis Vuitton sunglasses, among other items on attached list 
Within the last 6 hours your affiant interviewed Gary Lambson, .who was detained by Murray 
Police, concerning a stolen ring. Mr. Lambson stated that he purchased the ring from the suspect 
Daniel V Keener who lives at 1381 South Emery Street 
On 12/6/05 Mr. Lambson met with Daniel V Keener for the purpose of buying jewelry. Daniel 
V Keener traveled with Mr. Lambson to 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. Mr. Lambson was told that 
this was Daniel V Keener^ son's residence. The son is named Daniel Lee Keener. Inside the 
residence Daniel V Keener retrieved a bag of jewelry. Mr. Lambson said the bag contained 
rings, necklaces, watches and bracelets. Mr. Lambson purchased a ring for $50 from Daniel V 
Keener. 
Mr. Lambson said that Daniel V Keener put some of the jewelry to include the listed Anne Klein 
wrist watch in his pocket and left most of the jewelry in the bag at the listed residence. Daniel V. 
Keener then traveled back to his residence at 1381 South Emery St 
On 12/8/05 Mr. Lambson took the ring to Mike's Custom Jewelry and Repair at 254 East 6400 
South for the purpose of selling it The clerk at Mike's Jewelry recognized the ring as the one 
that belongs to another employee of Mike's Jewelry named Julie Baker. Mrs. Baker identified 
the ring to be a custom made ring that was stolen out of her vehicle along with other jewelry on 
11/5/05 at 145 West Pierpont Avenue (Salt Lake City case number 05-193011). Murray police 
Officer Stallings responded to Mike's Jewelry and questioned Mr. Lambson. Officer Stallings 
contacted' your affiant who responded to The Murray Police station and interviewed Mr. 
Lambson and obtained the above information. 
Your affiant showed Mr. Lambson the list of Jewelry stolen during the previously mentioned 
vehicle burglary. Mr. Lambson identified a yellow and white gold diamond ring and a Blue 
turquoise stretch bracelet as items he saw in Daniel V Keener bag of jewelry at the residence 
located on 849 North Sir Phillip Dr. residence. 
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Your affiant considers the information received ftom Ihe concerned citizen to be accurate and 
reliable because: 
The concerned citizen, Gary Lambson, has provided your affiant with his name, date of birth and 
criminal history. Gary Lambson has provided your affiant information against his best interest 
Your1 affiant has independently verified the information that Mr. rarnhson hag provided and 
found it to be true to the best of your affiants knowledge. Your affiant informed Mr. Lambson 
that if he gave your affiant any felse information he would be charged with interfering with an 
investigation. 
Mr. Lambson also stated that within the last 36 hours, he was in the residence at 1381 South 
Emery Street While in the residence he-observed several padcages~of meihamphetaming and 
knows the persons who live at or otherwise occupy the listed residence to be using 
methamphetamine. Mr. Lambson also stated that within the last 48 hours he overheard Daniel V 
Keener stating that he had a shotgun. 
Your affiant knows from training and experience that persons who use methamphetamine often 
exhibit unpredictable, paranoid and potentially violent behavior while under the influence of the 
stimulant 
Your affiant verified Mr. Lambsons information by checking police and state records and found 
that Jtaniftl V TCeener has been arrested numerous times for Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, the most recent arrest was on 5/5/2002. He was also arrested for Carrying a Loaded 
Firearm in a Vehicle on 6/30/89. Your affiant has also found that Daniel Lee Keener's drivers 
license shows the address of 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. Daniel has been arrested for numerous 
thefts including an Aggravated Burglary on 02/26/2000, numerous drug charges (the most recent 
on 05/12/05) and Strong Arm Robbery on 10/05/91: 
Your affiant checked police records on Daniel V Keener and showed a picture to Mr. Lambson 
who confirmed that this was the same individual that he/she made contact with while at the listed 
residence. Daniel V Keener has extensive criminal history, some of which includes possession 
of different controlled substances on multiple occasions, thefts, forgeries and assault 
Narcotic Detectives have conducted surveillance of the residence at 1381 South Emery St and 
observed 2 females leave the listed address and get into Utah listing 160YZK. That vehicle is 
listed to Brian Lybarger. Your affiant checked state records on Brian who has aggravated 
robbery, robbery, multiple thefts, assault, possession of controlled substances, possession of 
weapon and forgery. Your affiant talked with Agent Olive with AP&P who located a Tammy 
Lybarger 1381 South Emery Street who is currently on paper with AP&P. Tammy has carrying 
a concealed weapon, threatening with a weapon, use of a dangerous weapon during a fight, 
carrying concealed weapon, forgeries, possession of meth and other controlled substance charges 
and forgery. 
Your affiant desires to enter 1381 South Emery Street; and search for a Anne Klein watch, a 
Pave diamond ring, a Tiffany necklace with 'Tiffany* inscribed on the necklace and matching 
bracelet, a Omega yellow gold necklace, a diamond yellow gold tennis bracelet, a diamond cross 
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necldace in white gold, turquoise necklace blue with small brown beads, red and silver earrings, 
an antique white gold ring with a pink sapphire stone, a silver and pink ring with cubic zirconias, 
a blue and silver ring with cubic zirconias, and yellow gold diamond stud earrings, clothing, Ipod 
mp3 player, Louis Vuitton bags, 'Mac* makeup, Louis Vuitton sunglasses, among other items on 
attached list 
Your affiant also desired to search Daniel Vem Keener a white male adult D.OJ3. 05-19-1954, 
approximately 5'10" and 190 pounds with grey hair, for the above described property which Mr. 
Lambson observed on the suspect Daniel V Keener. 
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for presentation to the court 
by Deputy District Attorney fiL he Hf'/>f 5- . 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items 
anytime day or night because there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good reasons to wit: 
The premises which your affiant desires to search is located in a residential community. Your 
affiant has observed children playing in the area near the listed premises during the daylight 
hours. Your affiant has watched the premises during the evening hours and has noted that the 
pedestrian traffic near the listed residence appears to be considerably less during the evening 
hours. Your affiant has observed other residents of the community walking in close proximity to 
the listed premises. Your affiant feels that it would be safer for children who may live in the area 
as well as the other residents of the community if the warrant were to be served in the evening 
hours, during a time when children were not present and the pedestrian traffic around the 
grounds seemed to be less. 
Your affiant has also noted that there are businesses in the area of the listed residence. These 
businesses are open during the daytime hours and appear to have a large amount of business 
related traffic, which travels in close proximity to the listed address. Your affiant has watched 
the premises during the evening hours and has not noted that there is a decrease in such activity. 
A majority of the businesses in the area are closed during the evening hours. Your affiant feels 
that it would be safer for patrons of the nearby businesses as well as the other residents of the 
neighborhood if the warrant were to be served in the evening hours, during a time when 
pedestrian traffic around the listed premises seemed to be less. 
Your affiant believes it is necessary for search teams to get as close as possible to the named 
premises before being discovered because persons involved in an on-going narcotics distribution 
operation will attempt to destroy the narcotics if they believe the narcotics will be discovered by 
law enforcement personnel Your affiant believes die cover of darkness will allow search teams 
to get as close as possible to the premise before being discovered. 
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested search warrant not be required to 
give notice of the officer's authority or purpose because: 
Physical harm may result to any person if notice was given, and/or the property sought may 
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quicldy be destroyed, disposed o£ or secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
Your affiant has been informed by Mr. Lambson that there is electronic counter-surveillance 
equipment mounted above the doors. Your affiant knows through training and experience that' 
this Tnnri of activity is used as a way to forewarn of police action and that person(s) employing 
counter-surveillance are doing so in an attempt to flee or use force to impede officers attempts to 
rater the listed premises or to destroy or amc^l contraband. 
Your affiant has learned from other Narcotic Detectives that there is active human counter-
surveillance from this address. Occupants have been observed looking out windows and coming 
out the front door and watching up and down the street when vehicles come onto the street 
The persons living at or otherwise frequenting the listed address are abusing stimulants, namely 
methamphetamine. Your affiant knows through training and experience that persons who use 
stimulants often exhibit unpredictable, paranoid and potentially violent behavior while under the 
influence of the stimulant Your affiant believes the ability to quickly secure the drug users in 
the listed premises will assist in preventing the physical harm to any person during the execution 
of this warrant 
Your affiant has found histories on many of those residing at the listed address. Many of these 
criminal histories include, drug related charges, assaults and weapon violations. 
Detective Michael Hardin 
Affiant 
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In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DANIEL L. KEENER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE 
[ MOTION TO SUPPRESS SEARCH 
WARRANT 
Case No. 051909085 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
The defendant, Daniel Lee Keener, has filed a motion to suppress "evidence seized pursuant 
to the execution of a search warrant.'* Motion to Suppress Search Warrant and Memorandum in 
Support Thereof (the "Motion"), p. 1. Keener claims that the warrant is infirm because the Affidavit 
for Search Warrant did not disclose that the source of much of the information set forth therein was 
an individual detained by the police in connection with a "stolen ring," and not a "concerned 
citizen," as the affidavit states,1 For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the Motion.2 
BACKGROUND 
Detectives Michael Hardin and Doug Teerlink are veteran police officers with the Salt Lake 
City Police Department. In December 2005, Hardin was investigating a reported vehicle burglary, 
and Teerlink was investigating a potential marijuana distributor. 
On December 9, 2005, in connection with their investigations, Detectives Hardin and 
Teerlink simultaneously approached Third District Court Judge Judith Atherton and asked that she 
issue two search warrants. One of the warrants was for 1381 South Emery Street and the person of 
Daniel Vem Keener. The other warrant was for 849 North Sir Phillip Drive, the residence of Daniel 
Vern Keener's son, the defendant. Hardin swore to the affidavit for the Emery Street warrant, and 
Teerlink swore to the affidavit for the Sir Phillip Drive warrant. 
The principal source of information for both affidavits is an individual named Gary Lambson. 
Both affidavits describe Lambson as a "concerned citizen"; however, the affidavit sworn to by 
For the "concerned citizen" reference, see the Affidavit for Search Warrant of Detective Doug 
Teerlink ("Teerlink Affidavit"). For the "stolen ring" reference, see the Affidavit for Search Warrant of 
Detective Michael Hardin ("Hardin Affidavit"). Both affidavits are attached to the Motion. 
2The Motion came on for hearing on October 11, 2006. Jacey Skinner represented the State; 
Andrea Garland represented Keener* who was also present. 
\\jTt 
Detective Hardin also notes that Murray Police had detained Lambson "concerning a stolen ring." 
Hardin Affidavit, p. 2. 
Lambson told Detective Hardin that he had "purchased the ring from" Daniel Vern Keener. 
Id. More specifically, Lambson told Hardin that on December 6,2005, he "met with Daniel Vem 
Keener for the purpose of buying jewelry." Id. To this end, Lambson traveled with Daniel Vem 
Keener "to 849 North Sir PhilUp Drive," Daniel Lee Keener's residence. Id. Once "[ijnside the [Sir 
Phillip Drive] residence," Daniel Vem Keener "retrieved a bag of jewelry" that "contained rings, 
necklaces, watches, and bracelets," Id. Lambson purchased the ring "for $50." Id. Lambson also 
told Hardin that Daniel Vem Keener "left most of the jewelry in the bag at" the Sir Phillip Drive 
address. Id. 
On December 8, 2005, Lambson attempted to sell the ring at Mike's Custom Jewelry and 
Repair. The clerk recognized the ring as one that belonged to "another employee of Mike's Jewelry 
named JuKe Baker." Id. "Baker identified the ring to be a custom made ring that was stolen out of 
her vehicle along with other jewelry" on November 5, 2005, "at 145 West Pierpont Avenue (Salt 
Lake City case number 05-193011)." Id. 
Detective Hardin then showed Lambson a "list of the jewelry [reported] stolen" from 
Baker's vehicle. Id. (A copy of the list is attached to the detective's affidavit.) Lambson identified 
two pieces as items he saw in the "bag of jewelry at the residence located" on North Sir Phillip 
Drive-"a yellow and white gold diamond ring and a Blue [sic] turquoise stretch bracelet." Id. 
Lambson also told the detectives that "[w]hile in the residence of 849 North Sir Phillip 
Drive," he saw "two large bags of marijuana and a triple beam scale" sitting "on a table in a back 
room." Teerlink Affidavit, p. 2. According to Lambson, "one of the bags contained] chronic 
marijuana." Id. ("Chronic is a high quality marijuana." Id.) 
The detectives considered the information provided by Lambson "to be accurate and 
reliable." Id., p. 3. For reasons, the detectives noted, among others, that Lambson provided them 
with his "name, date of birth and criminal history" and that they placed him on notice that they 
would charge him with criminal conduct if any of the information he gave them turned out to be 
false. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
Keener contends that the execution of the search warrant on his residence violated Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Court first examines Keener's contention under the Utah constitution. See State V. Holm, 2006 
UT 31,P33,137P.3d 726 ("Because this court has endorsed the primacy approach to constitutional 
challenges, whereby we first attempt to resolve the constitutional challenges by appealing to our 
state constitution before turning to the federal constitution. . . . " ) ; see also Sinead McLoughlin, 
High Court Study: Choosing a "Primacy" Approach: Chief Justice Christine M. Durham 
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Advocating States Rights in Our Federalist System, 65 ALB, L. REV. 1161 (2002). Because the 
state constitutional analysis is dispositive, the Court does not address Keener's federal challenge.3 
The primary question the Motion presents is whether an "intentional misstatement in an 
affidavit supporting a warrant," whether the misstatement be material or immaterial, "requires 
suppression of the evidence" under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution. State v. Nielsen, 
727 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1986). Because the Court finds no misstatement, the question remains 
open. 
Had Detective Teerlink's affidavit stood alone, his characterization of Lambson as a 
"concerned citizen" would be troubling to the court. But it did not stand alone; rather, it was 
submitted alongside Detective Hardin's affidavit, which pointed out that Lambson had been 
"detained by Murray Police" regarding "a stolen ring." Hardin Affidavit, p. 2. That reference in 
Detective Hardin's affidavit, combined with Detective Teerlink's knowledge that Judge Atherton 
would be reviewing both his andDetective Hardin's affidavits together, dispelled any potential false 
impressioii. It is as if the detectives defined "concerned citizen" to mean Gary Lambsoti, a person 
of interest detained by the authorities.4 
The secondary question is whether, assuming the accuracy of the "concerned citizen " 
reference, the Teerlink Affidavit provided Judge Atherton with probable cause to issue the search 
warrant for the Sir Phillip Drive residence. "Where a search warrant supported by an affidavit is 
challenged as having been issued without an adequate showing of probable cause,... [the court's] 
review focuses on the magistrate's probable cause determination." State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, 
P 14, 48 P.3d 872 (citations omitted). "In reviewing the magistrate's decision,. . . [the court] 
assessfes] whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause 
existed." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Further, the court affords "the magistrate's decision 
great deference and considers] the affidavit relied upon by the magistrate in its entirety and in a 
common sense fashion." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
Having reviewed Teerlink's Affidavit in its entirety, the court concludes that Judge 
Atherton "had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed and that evidence of 
illegal conduct would be found at the" Sir Phillip Drive location. Id.,V\ 6. The Teerlink Affidavit 
contained a detailed account of a transaction at the Sir Phillip Drive residence involving the 
purchase of reportedly stolen merchandise. It also contained an account of the existence of 
The parties agree that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution does not provide less 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Therefore, a finding that the Sir Phillip Drive warrant was constitutionally permissible 
under a state constitutional analysis necessarily means that it was permissible under a federal 
constitutional analysis too. | 
4The State suggests that it was more accurate for the detectives to refer to Lambson as a 
"concerned citizen" than an "informant" as the detectives promised Lambson nothing in exchange for the 
information. 
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marijuana that was specific as to quantity, type, and location. This particularized information, 
combined with the fact that the detectives knew Lambson's identity and disclosed it, that Lambson 
obtained his information first-hand, and that he was willing to stand behind the information despite 
being threatened with prosecution if it turned out to be false provides the requisite substantial basis. 
See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah App. 1993) (probable cause found where "no 
indication in the facts that the [confidential] informant received anything from the police in 
exchange for the information" and where the information was "based on personal observation" and 
"substantiated"). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the Motion.5 The matter is referred back to 
Judge Atherton for any further proceedings. 
DATED this ^ L day of November, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
5The court is of the opinion that additional oral argument would not be helpful; therefore, it is 
slriking the hearing in this matter currently set for November 17,2006. 
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